Abstract

The article discusses relationships and contexts for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland (2008). It positions Eikeland (2008) in relation to Moss (2011, 2012, 2014) but with a side view to Cammack (2013), Kristjansson (2014), and Taylor (2016). These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phrónēsis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical.

Keywords: deliberation, dialectics, habit, imagination, phrónēsis, virtue

Introduction

The purpose of this text is limited, pretending neither to be exhaustive nor complete concerning its subjects nor in relation to the texts it discusses, nor will I be able to refer to the broader discussions on almost every aspect of Aristotle's philosophy. I will discuss relationships and context for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland (2008). "Reason" is, of course, a rather imprecise expression, since it could translate several different Greek expressions used by Aristotle and Plato (nous, diánoia, phrónēsis, boûleusis, lògos, and more). The same goes for "knowledge". I will position Eikeland (2008) in relation to a few recent texts, mainly Moss (2011, 2012, 2014), but with a side view to Cammack (2013), Kristjansson (2014), and Taylor (2016). They all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly but in different ways with Eikeland. I will not be able to do full justice to these texts either. What

1 Although I am the author of this book, I have chosen to refer to it in the third person in this text. For further references to secondary literature, see the references in Eikeland (2008).
follows will suggest how the perspectives presented in Eikeland (2008) elaborate, unite, and transcend the apparently different perspectives of the other texts considered.

I focus on two questions, 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal (télos or skopós) for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. Concerning the first question, then, the dominant view – succinctly summarized by Moss (2011) and Taylor (2016) – has for several decades been that, in Aristotle, phrónezis grasps not only the means but also the ends of practical deliberation, i.e. that we deliberate about both ends and means. This has recently been challenged by Moss (Moss 2011, 2012, 2014). Concerning the second question, the role of dialectics or dialogue in Aristotle is generally contested but often based on a restricted conception of dialectics as formal "reasoning" from generally accepted opinions (éndoxa). Since Owen (1961), dialectics has gradually received increased attention. Its central role has also been increasingly recognized (cf. Aubenque 1962; Wieland 1962; de Pater 1965; Owen 1968; Evans 1977; Irwin 1988; Sim 1999; Berti 2004; Schramm 2004; Eikeland 1997, 190-194, idem. 2008, 217ff). In addition, both questions are parts of a larger context concerning the relationship between theoretical and practical knowing and reasoning in Aristotle. The theoretical and the practical in Aristotle, are often seen as totally separate domains. According to Aristotle, they differ concerning ends pursued, the theoretical being merely concerned with discerning differences and similarities and truth and falsity by affirming and denying (katáphasis – apóphasis), while the practical is concerned with what to do (NE1139a21-b6; OtS 432b27-433a30; OtS 407a4-31; OtS 429a23-24; Top 141a5-10; Cat17a1-8; cf. Eikeland 2008, 35, fn.35).

Eikeland (2008) starts as an interpretation of phrónezis, based on a comprehensive reading of the whole Corpus Aristotelicum. It criticizes the tendency to isolate phrónezis as a putatively independent alternative to tékhne and epistémhe, and to use only the ethical works and mostly Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, as the interpretive base (Eikeland 2008, 23ff.). Phrónezis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy. Eikeland's claim (ibid., 212ff.), to which the last half of his book is dedicated, is that this totality is fundamentally dialectical. After summarizing some mostly uncontroversial understandings of phrónezis, explaining and discussing the ethical and intellectual virtues, and delimiting phrónezis from rhetoric, practical syllogisms, and technical reasoning or calculation (ibid., 51-114), Eikeland focuses on two controversial issues concerning

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2 The concepts “theoretical” and “practical” are also too imprecise but cannot be discussed any further here (cf. Eikeland 2008, 79-96 and 301-327).
phrónēsis, the relationship between ends and means in ethical deliberation (ibid., 115-137) and the relationship between general knowledge and knowledge of particulars (ibid., 138-180).

Moss (2011, 2012, 2014) discusses the first question above. Her main claim is that, contrary to the current dominant view, phrónēsis or ethical deliberation tells us neither what ends are, nor what ends to pursue. It only considers how to pursue given ends or goals. The ends in ethics are set by our ethical characters. Bad characters seek bad goals or goals which merely appear good to them, good characters seek truly good goals (Eikeland 2008, 116-121). Preferably, ends are defined by virtue, since virtue makes the goal right in Aristotle's thinking, but apparently without phrónēsis or deliberation. Truly virtuous individuals see truth and seek what is truly good, others merely apparent goods (NE 1113a23-b2, 1114a31-b25, 1140b17-20, 1144a31-36; EE1229b26, 1236b34-1237a9; Pol 1332a22-25). Deliberation, however, is only about the means, or what contributes to the end (tà sumphéronta pros tò télos) (Eikeland 2008, 194). Moss invokes several unequivocal quotes from Aristotle to prove her point that Aristotle meant exactly what he wrote many times, i.e. that virtue makes the goal right, phrónēsis only the things towards the goal (NE 1144a7-9, 1145a5-7, 1151a15-19; EE 1227b23-25). Eikeland (2008, 104ff, 133, 210, 224) and Moss agree on this and in their refutation of the dominant view that despite the textual evidence against it in Aristotle, phronetic deliberation somehow concerns the choice and clarification of ends as well. The motive for the dominant view seems to have been that if we take what Moss's evidence says literally, Aristotle's viewpoint becomes indistinguishable from the reduced and instrumental conception of reason found in Hume (1978) where reason is "the slave of the passions", and "passions" are preferences given as natural facts (data). It also conflates phrónēsis with cleverness (deinótês), the ability to deliberate about any goal, good or bad (NE 1144a23-29; cf. Eikeland 2008, 103). Hence, the possibility of distinguishing between true and apparent goods as ends is decisive in the thinking of Aristotle. Somehow, saving some form of rationality in deciding ends – i.e. the role of knowledge and reason in defining the virtues – seems necessary even for saving phrónēsis as different from mere cleverness.

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3 Eikeland (2008, 22-131) discusses and distinguishes between télos (end, causa formalis, connected to praxis and enérgeia) and skopós (aim, causa finalis, connected to poíēsis and kínēsis). These distinctions are not pursued by Moss, although they are quite important. They cannot be pursued here either.

4 Eikeland (2008, fn. 92) has many more references in support of this.

5 Hämäläinen (2015) defends an intellectualist view against Moss, in line with the dominant view but without really engaging with Moss’s arguments and evidence.
Since Eikeland and Moss agree in restricting *phrónēsis* to "the means", I will not use space to argue the case but move straight to the question about the rationality or reasonability of ends, or rather, how do we clarify and define ends, including the virtues, and how do we become virtuous, according to Aristotle. How does Moss think ends are set? She concludes: "it is character, not intellect, that gives us our goal" (Moss 2011, 256), neither the discursive or argumentative intellect, consisting in *lógos*, nor the intuitive (*nous*), supposedly lacking *lógos*. Ends are not established intellectually, she claims, although virtue as a result of "good upbringing", establishes habits that are still "cognitive" by providing imagination (*phantasia*) with perceptual images of ends desired because they seem good to us. Even contemplators get their ultimate goals through "correct" ethical habituation (Moss 2011, 259). Moss's presentation of how this happens (ibid., 251-259) is in several ways close to Eikeland's (2008, 181-299). For example, when Moss says:

> My claim – call it Practical Empiricism – is that habituation can furnish starting points because it is a very close analogue of the first stages of induction. Through habituation in virtuous activity one repeatedly perceives or experiences such activity; the perception in question is pleasurable perception, which amounts to perception of such activity as good. (Moss 2011, 255)

Still, there are important aspects missing from Moss's presentation, which makes it misrepresent Aristotle's position. How are habits cognitive? The discussion requires clarification of what Moss means not only by "virtue" but also by "reason" and "rational" when claiming that "reason does not give us our goals" (Moss 2014, 240). What is virtue? What is reason? What is "correct ethical habituation"? These questions are decisive. Aristotle, of course, does not talk about "reason" but about many kinds of *lógos* and different uses of *lógos* connected to *nous*, *diánoia*, *bouleusis*, rhetoric, dialectic, *apódeixis*, etc. (Eikeland 2008, 214). As indicated, he also talks about apparent and true virtues, modified virtue and absolute virtue. In addition, he talks about bad and good habits and characters. So, who or what distinguishes them and how?

If questions like these are not discussed, essential challenges remain. The first is the mentioned instrumentalisation of reason. The other is how to avoid reducing the aims, ends, or goals to *either* irrationality, arbitrariness, or naturally given passion, *or* to habitual conventionalism, localism, traditionalism, and consequently, relativism. Despite restricting the task of *phrónēsis* to deliberating means, Moss has an ambition "to save Aristotle from the charge of Humeanism" (Moss 2014, 240). The same goes for Eikeland (2008, 103). Moss's

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6 Somehow, in Aristotle’s discussions, *nous* seems to be sometimes with *lógos* and sometimes without. Se the discussion in Eikeland (2008, 212-271).
interpretation may be able to avoid the pitfall of irrationality. But her solution hardly escapes neither instrumentalising reason nor relativizing goals. Ultimately, of course, the question at stake, is to what degree we as human beings are mere "products", extraneously determined by biological, psychological, social, and other causes from which habit alone cannot save us.

Comparing Moss's position to Eikeland's also provokes other questions. First, what is the role of knowledge or knowing (gnôsis, epistêmê) in acquiring ethical virtue and acting virtuously? Second, Aristotle's ban on lógos concerning goals, presupposes a certain context (Eikeland 2008, 132-137), not considered by Moss. Third, how does her position relate to Aristotle's statements (a) that lógos and nous are the télos for human development (Pol 1334b14-28; EE 1220a3), (b) that we need to mobilize all the following to become good and virtuous (agathôi kai spoudaiôi): phûsis (nature), éthos (habit), and lógos (reason) (Pol 1332a36-b7), and (c) that the goodness of individuals depends on both the part of the soul having lógos and the part able to follow lógos (Pol 1333a16-20)? Fourth, Moss suggests a connection between induction and habituation but does not discuss the role of dialogue or dialectics, so central for the discussion in Eikeland (2008) and made explicit through the title of his Chapter 6.2.1 "Nóêsis as Dialogue, or, the Reason Why Aristotle Insists on Letting Phrônêsis Deliberate about Means Only."

Cammack (2013) and Taylor (2016) have picked up on the challenge from Moss, neither one accepting her dismissal of reasoning concerning ends of deliberation. Cammack (2013) recognizes that there are many forms of lógos, deliberation is not the only one, she refers to the "professional setting" for deliberations, and she mentions "theoretical reasoning" as a potential, at least raising the question of the relationship between ethical virtues and theoretical reason. She hardly elaborates, specifies, or utilizes these possibilities, however, in challenging Moss's main point, that virtue, or mere habit, provides the end.

Taylor (2016) considers three accounts of how the end of deliberation is acquired: (a) by virtue of character, (b) by dialectic, i.e. critical reasoning concerning authoritative beliefs, and (c) by induction from data of experience. In his view, dialectic and experience are required for grasping virtuous ends for deliberation by the intellect. He agrees with Moss that ends are not subject to deliberation but does not thereby exclude the possibility that they are acquired as the result of some process of intellectual enquiry. Although he distinguishes between poiësis-tékhne and praxis-phrônêsis, he seems to conflate them, and thereby calculation (logismós) and deliberation (boûleusis), as merely two forms of practical reasoning (Eikeland 2008, 68ff). He points to the two different ways of being rational in Aristotle but seems to think the rational part (tô lógon ekhon) "instructs" the part not fully rational (tô álogon). As the following will indicate, Taylor also works with too simple ac-
counts of dialectics as reasoning from accepted opinions, and of induction and experience as well, and this I think leads him off track in his discussion about ends and aims for deliberation.

1. What is the role of knowledge or knowing in virtue and virtuous action?

Aristotle describes virtue or areté as a héxis or habitus, which means an acquired ability, skill, habit, or incorporated disposition and inclination for acting and feeling in certain ways, resulting from practice, exercise, or habituation (Cat 8b25-9a13, 12a26-13a37; NE 1103a16-26, 1103b22, 1114a10; EE 1220b1 and 18-20). A habitus can be either bad or good, but virtue is the best habitus within its field or kind of activity. Generally, virtue means what makes any "thing" or activity work at its best (árístos) (NE 1120a6). It renders (apotelei) both something in a good general state, and (apodídôsin) its activity and work good (NE 1106a14-26). Ethical virtues are excellences of character (êthos) in contrast to excellences of the intellect (nous / diánoia). Character (êthos) springs from habit (éthos) (NE 1103a14-30). Every virtue is the result of a process of perfection (teleiósìs) from within a specific practice, starting inchoately, and resulting in a certain virtuous habitus (NE 1103a26; Ph246a10-248a9; Metaph 1021b21; EE 1220a22-b10). A virtue, then, is a potential or capacity (dúnamis). As a perfected, competent ability to act, it is an entelékheia or actuality of a fully developed potential.

The ethical virtues are called "âlogoi" by Aristotle, a word sometimes translated as "irrational". But they are not irrational in opposition or contradiction to reason, or by being unattainable by reason. Âlogoi means they do not consist in the use of lógos or reasoned speech like the intellectual virtues (epistêmê, nous, phrônèsis, têkhnê, and more) which consist in lógos in themselves (kuriós kai en hautô) (NE 1103a2-3; Pol1333a16-19). Their lógos-character makes these virtues intellectual. The ethical virtues are not necessarily "wordless" or tacit, however, but they cannot be reduced to reasoning words and speech, i.e. to intellectual virtues. Still, they can be influenced and must be guided by lógos, following recommendations or instructions it provides. The standard for choosing in the practical sphere is that the pleasures, pains, actions, and emotions of our non-lingual parts do not interfere with, but rather support and strengthen the ability of the soul to reason correctly and follow reason. To "act according to right reason (katà tòn orthón lógon prattein)" – as the contemporary saying went – is to act without letting those parts which do not consist in lógos, like habits, skills, emotions, desires, and actions, interfere with the correct function-
ing of the part consisting in lògos. In one place (EE 1220b1-7), character (êthos) as such is even defined as the ability to follow reason. Thus, the ethical virtues do take part in lògos but in a different way from the intellectual virtues (NE 1102b13-1103a3; EE1219b26-1220a13). In being able to listen to and follow lògos without being lògos these tacit abilities differ both from clean-cut reason or mind (nous, diànoia), consisting in the use or activities of lògos on the one hand, and from pure corporeal nature (sôma or sarx), unable to become modified directly by lògos on the other. As hêxeis, the ethical virtues occupy a middle ground as properties of the living "ensouled" body (psukhê), the mediator between the two extremes of mind and the corporeal body. Other forms of álogoi, i.e. irrationality really opposing or obstructing reason, Aristotle leaves out of his discussion (NE 1102b23-26; EE 1219b31).

This is an important reason why Aristotle insists on saying that the ethical virtues exist with good and articulated reasons or justifications (metà lógou), as an important modification of the saying about acting "according to right reason" (NE1103b33-35, 1144b16-30). Aristotle emphasizes that ethical virtues are not merely "in accordance with" right reason. Things can be done in a formally correct way – according to reason – by chance, technically, or under the influence of others as in mechanical rule-following, or in following orders (NE 1105a17-b9). On the other hand, ethical virtues are not in themselves reasons (lógous), or kinds of epistêmê, as Socrates argued (NE1145b21-31; EE1216b3-25), because they require right action and emotion, not just abstracted arguments; words or thoughts. The ethical virtues are hêxeis of the embodied soul or ensouled body – converted into right action and right emotion – with correct reasoning or justification (metà tou orthou lógou).

Aristotle sets up criteria for ethically virtuous acts in several places (NE 1105a17-b12, 1109b35-1112a17, 1135a20-b11, 1144a13-23; MM 1197b37-1198a21). He mentions three qualities of an agent, necessary for his acts to count as virtuous. First, he has to act with knowledge of what he is doing (eidôs), secondly, his actions must spring from a deliberate choice (prohairesis) (Eikeland 2008, 116-121), and they must be chosen for their own sake (proairoûmenos d'autá), without ulterior motives, merely as instruments for achieving something else (NE 1144a16), and thirdly, they must spring from a firm and unchanging character (NE 1105a26-b18, 1144a13-23; cf. NE 1135a20-b11). Finally, doers of virtuous acts must also enjoy doing them, since no one would call someone "just" if he did not like acting justly (NE 1099a18).

Those MM1208a5-21, NE1103b33-35, and 1138b34, which sets out to define the right reason or orthòs lògos, and its standard of excellence (hóros) in Book VI.
What, then, is the role of knowledge or knowing in developing virtue and acting virtuously in Aristotle? Does lógos participate merely in deliberating the means, or even in developing and defining the virtues as ends of deliberation? Virtue may not be epistémê. But is epistémê excluded? Although some form of knowledge or knowing is apparently included as a central criterion for calling anything virtuous, Book II of the Nichomachean Ethics (NE 1105b2-5) does say that knowing strengthens the ethical virtues little or nothing (pros dè tò tás aretás tò mèn eidénai mikrón é oudèn iskhúei). Is he contradicting himself immediately after requiring virtuous acts to be done knowingly? Both the immediate and the wider contexts are important for understanding this. The paragraph (NE 1105a16-b18) is written to distinguish ethical from technical virtue (tékhnê) on the one hand, and from mere knowledge (epistémê) on the other. The similarity between technical arts and ethical virtues is that they are acquired through practice (NE 1103b7-25, 1104a27-b3, 1105a13-b18). But works of art exist as separate products which can be evaluated in and by themselves (EE 1219a13-23; NE 1105a27-28), and when you have learnt either medicine, geometry, or house construction you are considered a professional in those fields (EE 1216b3-25). Ethical virtue, however, does not have a separate "product" apart from acting justly, friendly, truthfully etc. Also, in a technical art, a voluntary error is not as bad as an involuntary error. A voluntary error shows you are in control and know what you are doing as a master of the art, as when a virtuoso singer or pianist slips out of tune on purpose. In ethics, however, a voluntary mistake is worse than an involuntary mistake (NE 1140b23-24). A voluntary mistake would imply e.g. inflicting a premeditated injustice on somebody, or consciously not bothering to find out anything about the special background of someone or about the circumstances for an act before judging. Doing this is worse than doing the same "not-on-purpose". Knowing and understanding what justice is, does not automatically make you into a just person, and if you have a thorough knowledge and understanding of justice, but do not even attempt to act justly, it makes you more unethical than being inactive or a perpetrator without the knowledge or understanding (MM 1183b8-17, 1199a19-29). Injustice is not the same as ignorance (Top 114b9-13) the way amateurism is in the technical arts. The injustice increases when unjust acts are done with knowledge, and just acts can be done even without knowledge. In ways like this, distinguishing similarities and differences, Aristotle establishes the field of ethics apart from science and technical arts.

As for phróneis, it is an intellectual virtue but not only, as Aristotle points out. To forget something purely intellectually held, or merely technically performed, is not considered an ethical deficiency. But forgetting phróneis would be, as would also forgetting about justice. Phróneis is distinguished as a different form of knowledge from the other intellectual virtues (génos állo gnôseôs), having a truly ethical import in itself (EE
1246b36; MM 1183b8-17; Top 152b1-5). In addition, ethics does not allow a division of labour as in technical arts. In acting virtuously, personal responsibility cannot be delegated to any external instance. We cannot do in ethics as we do concerning health. We do not all study medicine to become healthy. Instead, we follow recommendations and get treatment from experts, since medicine is a technical art of making (poiēsis). In ethics, however, we cannot simply take orders from others possessing phrônēsis. Following advice or orders from others presumed competent is not sufficient in relation to the requirements for ethical virtue and acting virtuously (NE 1143b14-33).

What Aristotle says, then, is that apart from the criterion of knowledge (plên autò tò eidénaí), the virtue criteria mentioned do not apply for technical virtues (NE 1105b1-3). Concerning knowledge, ethical and technical virtues are similar, but technical activity is not chosen for its own sake nor does it have to spring from a firm character. It does not even have to be deliberately chosen. Acting unwillingly or under command does not destroy the validity of technical performance. So, the apparent dismissal of the importance of knowledge for ethics, concerns knowledge in isolation. Knowledge alone qualifies you as a "scientist" and as a master artisan. Knowledge alone does not qualify you as an ethically good individual. The paragraph in Book II of the Nichomachean Ethics is polemically directed at people who think they become ethically good from merely discussing virtue without practising (NE 1105b9-18). Aristotle modifies but does not dismiss the Socratic requirement to know what virtue is, however (EE11216b3-39). So, in ethics, knowledge is insufficient. But is it really necessary?

As the Magna Moralia (MM 1198a15-21) explicates, it is possible to act "in accordance with right reason", i.e. formally correct (orthōs) in accordance with ethical virtue, merely from some irrational impulse (hormê tini álogô), without deliberate choice (prohairesis), and without knowledge (oudè gnôsei), i.e. by accident. This would not deserve praise, however, and would not be counted as virtuous practice. You are not counted as virtuous for doing the right thing merely habitually, accidentally, or "hypocritically". Although anything done by inclination may be counted as part of a certain habitus, virtue as a habitus implies more. It is not like any habit you are drilled into.

Requirements for an act to be virtuous can also be gleaned from examples of imperfect, insufficient, or merely apparent virtue, e.g. courage (andreía). Aristotle lists, slightly differently in the three Ethics (EE 1228a27-1230a36; MM 1090b9-1191a35; NE1115a5-1117b22), five conditions sometimes called courage from similarity (kath'homoiótēta, katà metáforan) without being true courage. They are 1) civic courage (politikê), based on shame in relation to current conventional standards, 2) military courage (stratiótikê), based on experience and knowledge of how to encounter danger, 3) inexperienced courage (di'
apeirían kai ágnoian), based on lack of knowledge, 4) hopeful courage (kat’ elpida), based on high expectations, and 5) unreasonably emotional courage (dià páthos alógiston). Truly courageous individuals follow reason and act because reason shows what is truly noble to do (EE1229b26). The truly courageous relate to the truth, and neither shame, technical knowledge, lack of knowledge, high hopes, nor passion, is enough to qualify an act as courageous. Courage, as virtue in general, is not knowledge alone, but only acting knowingly qualifies as virtuous acts.

Summing up, then, virtuous acts are distinguished from merely doing things a) mechanically, as in following a rule, an order, or habit, or b) unknowingly, meaning not knowing whether and why an act is an ethically good act, or c) coincidentally, by chance, meaning not deliberately chosen from an established virtuous disposition or habitus, or d) for ulterior motives and not for their own sake, reducing virtuous acts to instruments. Fulfilling these requirements takes more than imitation, repetition, obedience, and the uncritical establishment of any habit whatsoever through habituation. Explicit knowledge of and reasoning about the means is clearly necessary. But is it sufficient? Is knowledge of and reasoning about the ends – i.e. of what happiness, courage, wisdom, and other virtues are – necessary? The preceding discussion creates a suspicion that it is.

2. The context for the ban on deliberation about ends

Before continuing, the context for the strange restrictions Aristotle puts on deliberation must be clarified. As indicated, Aristotle states over and over that ethical virtue produces the right ends or objectives for ethical practice and that there is no reasoning or argument, no syllogism or lógos about these (NE1144a7-9, 1144a20-23, 1144a31-33, 1151a15-19; EE 1227b25, 1227b38, 1228a2). Ends are posited. We can wish for them and have opinions about them, but apparently not deliberate about them, discuss them, or even choose them (EE1226a16). Nobody chooses his end by deliberate choice, Aristotle claims, only the means (EE1226a8, 1226b10). The reason becomes clearer, however, when he presents examples of why "nobody" deliberates about or deliberately chooses their ends or objectives. Some ends or goals seem genuinely beyond reasoning and deliberate choice. It might seem unreasonable to say that we deliberately choose to be healthy or happy. Wanting this, we choose what we believe to be appropriate means for attaining it without having full control over the attainment itself. Banning other ends from deliberation seems more difficult to understand. Context explains, however.
A doctor does not deliberate about whether he should try to heal, an orator does not deliberate about whether to persuade or not, a politician does not deliberate about whether to produce good laws, and likewise no other artist or artisan deliberates about the ends of his art when performing professionally (NE 1112b12-16; EE 1227b23-1228a4). This is revealing. Here, Aristotle does not write existentially about "man as such" but about how trained professionals think who are already established within their professional horizons when they exercise their proper professional competence qua physician, orator, etc. Once inside a defined discipline – when you already are a doctor, or an orator, etc. – you take certain things for granted, i.e. the ends and objectives of the discipline, and presumably, you already know what it means to heal, to persuade, etc. These "professional" horizons are taken for granted, not only in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, talking about ethics. It pervades Aristotle's thinking, and he states the principles behind many times. It is well known that Aristotle insists that there is no demonstration (apódeixis) of first principles. This is part of the background for his view in the Posterior Analytics (PoA 72b19-32, 76a31-36, 77a36-b15, 84a29-33, 90b18-91a12, 99b15-19), in the Physics (Ph 184b26-185a21, 253a33-b6), in the Topica (Top 101a35-b4), in Sophistical Refutations (SR 170a20-b11), and in the Magna Moralia (MM 1182b23-1183a5) that neither a geometer, nor a physicist, nor any other professional, neither should nor has to account for the basic principles or ends of his own discipline qua performing professional (Metaph 1005a29-32). Whatever somebody says qua professional, presupposes the grasp of the proper disciplinary first principles and ends. This is also the proper context for why and how the virtues – both professional and ethical – presuppose ends and why ends are "laid down" (keitai) in a similar manner as hypotheses in theoretical sciences (NE1112b16, 1151a15-19, EE1222b15-1223a20, 1226a8-14, 1226b11, 1226b30, 1227a 7-10, 1227b25).

Properly contextualized, then, Aristotle does not say that no human being could ever discuss or clarify basic principles and ends, only that performing professionals do not. In every discipline, whether tékhné or epistêmê, a certain kind or genus of being or activity has always already been chosen, clarified, and defined as the subject (Metaph 996b27-997a25, 1003b22, 1004a3-7, 1025b8, 1063b36; PoA75a38, 87a38-b4, 90b30-91a12; NE 1094b25; Pol 1288b11-12). As professional performers, we are defined in relation to specific subjects, fields, and contexts as frameworks. Professional practice reasons and deliberates from presupposed primary principles and ends. This is how Aristotle formulates it. For Aristotle (NE 1095a31-b8), there is an important difference between arguments (lógoi) leading to (epi) ends and principles, and arguments leading from (apò) them. Deliberation moves not to the end but from it (apò tou tēlous) (EE 1227a16), or from a principle and from a certain defined form (apò tēs arkhês kai tou eidos) (Metaph 1032b16). The argument is that since
the forms, ends, and basic principles are clear, this and that is what we must do, and we deliberate until we have brought the starting point of the generation of the end, back to something we can do, here and now (EE 1226b13-14). Searching for or questioning basic principles and objectives of an activity or discipline is not something we do as professionals performing within defined disciplinary subjects. But, of course, professional deliberation does need a true conception or assumption (hupólêpsis) of the ends pursued. Phrónēsis presupposes a true conception of ends (NE 1142b31-33, 1151a19, 1142b16-22)s. This does not mean, however, that phrónēsis is responsible for developing virtue, or the corresponding insights, defining the ends.

Hence, "demonstration" too is called apó-deixis (de-duction or de-monstration), showing or pointing out what follows from (apó- / de-) some principle being as it is (OtS 407a27), contrasted to epi-agôgê (induction). In this respect, then, deliberation resembles demonstration, starting from ends and basic principles as given (EE 1227a6-20, 1227b20-1228a5), although deduction and deliberation move in quite different ways towards their conclusions. What leads to the ends and basic principles of the disciplines, however, is a different process. Moving "up" (ánô, PoA 82a21-24) belongs to a different capacity (allês dunâmeôs) (MM 1182b23-31).

Accordingly, the context for discussing deliberation, deliberate choice, and phrónēsis, is not how we become virtuous. It is not the development of virtue. Nor is it how ends are defined. The context is how we think and act, once we have become ethically virtuous, i.e. how "professional", highly competent, ethical actors do it. The context is the performance of virtue. A phrónimos has to be ethically virtuous and good already. Phrónēsis as a reasoning power is essential for being able to act virtuously in practice, here-and-now. Hence, the contextualisation of the ban on providing and discussing ends through deliberation, makes the ban peculiar to professional performance. Neither deliberation nor demonstration as specific forms of lógos, provides ends and principles. There is no general ban against involving other forms of lógos in their development and definition, however. Arguments (lógoi) do exist, leading to (epì) ends and principles (NE 1095a31-b8). As Cammack (2013) indicates, there are other forms of lógos than deliberation, and these many different forms are starting points for Eikeland's suggested way out of the impasse (Eikeland 2008, 212-214).

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s Hupólêpsis is generally any assumption on the same level as dôxa, which may be either true or false (see EN 1139b17; MM1197a30-31; OtS427b7-428b5; Top119b4; Ph 227b12-14). Hence, EN 1142b31-33 hardly says more than orthodoxia in EN 1151a19.
3. From imagination (phantasia) to dialogical gatherings (dialektikai sunódoi)

After effectively dethroning phrônêsis as provider of goals for deliberation, Moss (2011, 252ff.) mobilizes phantasía or imagination to help explain how habituated character (éthos, hêxis, éthos, aretê) provides deliberators with ends. She uses On the Soul and the Movement of Animals to characterize this ability of character to provide images of ends as a non-rational, perceptive cognitive faculty (Moss 2011, 252; idem. 2014, 222). To support this, she invokes what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN1098b2-6) about habituation generating practical ends as analogous to induction generating theoretical principles. In De Anima (433b11-13) Aristotle talks about the end or aim of practical deliberation being set by either thought or imagination (noêthênai è phantasthênai). If we take this seriously, then, there must be a connection and even overlap between not merely phantasía and habituated character but even between nous and character, including virtuous character. By focusing on imagination alone, however, Moss conflates the important distinction Aristotle makes between apparent and true goods (Eikeland 2008, 118, 361-371).

On the Soul divides the soul differently from how it is done in the Nicomachean Ethics. The major division in On the Soul cuts across the division in the Ethics between the two parts taking part in lógos in different ways, the one being lógos (tò lógon ekhon), the other being able to listen to and follow lógos (tò álogan). The division in On the Soul is between 1) a part, generating knowledge (tò gnôristikôn or theôrêтикôn), whose task it is to think (noein), distinguish (krinein), and perceive (aisthánesthai), and 2) another part concerned with the individual’s movement (kinêtikôn) (MA700b19-21, OtS404b28-29, 427a17-20, 432a15-20, cf. 411a26-b1)9. Phantasía is placed with aísthêsis (perception), doxa (opinion), epistêmê (knowledge), and nous (mind) in the first category whereby we distinguish and are cognitively right or wrong (kath’ hên krinoumen kaì alêtheúomen ê pseudómeta) (OtS 428a1-5, 427a17-22, 427b9-15, 432a15-17). This division creates wider and more reasonable categories than Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, especially concerning the first. While praxis-phrônêsis and poiêsis-têkhnê and the whole logistikôn department in the Ethics fall within the kinêtikôn department of On the Soul, the gnôristikôn, kritikôn, or theôrêтикôn, is more diverse than the epistêmonikôn part in the Ethics. Strictly speaking, the epistemonikôn contains only epistêmê or science in an extreme form (NE 1139b19) dealing only with things completely stable and universal, which also exist by

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9 The mind (nous), as self-consciously judging and distinguishing, is self-identical across all activities, “departments”, and different perceptive faculties of the soul (OtS407a7, 408b19-31, 411b7-11, 426b8-427a15, 430b6).
necessity and have received a deductive formulation. The wider distinguishing or theoretical part in On the Soul (432a16) deals descriptively and analytically with all existing things, permanent and general, or changing and particular, thought of, imagined, or perceived. Hence, the theoretical spans wider than the epistemic (OtS 407a24-31) and contains more than epistêmê. The epistemonikôn of the Nicomachean Ethics is one part of a wider theoretikón in On the Soul (Eikeland, 2008, 75f, 98f). Even súnesis, or the concrete understanding of particulars, "orphaned" as part of neither the epistemonikôn nor the logistikón in the Ethics, clearly belongs in the theorëtikôn of On the Soul, being merely distinguishing (kritikê mónon) concerning particulars (NE 1143a10 and 30). Súnesis is an intellectual virtue with lógos created by using the faculty of opinion (tò doxastikôn) in distinguishing well or correctly (NE 1143a14-17). Neither súnesis nor opinion is epistêmê, however.

Like opinion, imagination (phantasia) can be right or wrong, true or false, and mostly, imagination is false according to Aristotle (OtS428a1-18, 428a12, 428b18-26, 429a5-9, 432a8-14, 433a10-13, 433b30, 434a6-22). Men live by imagination when nous is lacking (OtS 429a5-9). As with perception, even animals have phantasías (OtS 428a20-25). But both perception and imagination exist both as a primitive ability to distinguish (dúnamis kritikê) hardly touched by lógos (PoA99b35-100a3), and as a more advanced version becoming immersed in lógos as soon as perceptions and images start being qualified as having either this or that characteristic. So, the gnôristikôn or kritikôn, or, with Moss, the cognitive part of On the Soul, contains aisthêsis (perception), doxa (opinion), phantasía (imagination), súnesis (understanding), epistêmê (scientific knowledge), and nous. But although cognitive, they are not all strictly theoretical, since some of them also belong to animals without lógos. Some of them belong to the álogon part in the Ethics, able to listen to and follow lógos. There are even a few other faculties or activities not listed, however, which must be categorised as cognitive and part of tò gnôristikôn.

First, in the same way as with perception and imagination, practically acquired experience (empeiría) belongs in the gnôristikôn department of the soul, partly independent of lógos and partly immersed in lógos. As argued and shown in Eikeland (1997, 2008), and despite the expositions in Metaphysics (980a22-982a3) and Posterior Analytics (99b15-100b17), experience as empeiría is never just passive, suffering receptivity (páthos) with Aristotle. It is not reducible to sense perception (aisthêsis). It produces the ability (dúnamis) to act in certain ways (Metaph 981a14, 980b26-981b6; NE1116b9-12, 1141b15-22, 1142a14-15, 1180b16-25; EE1217a4; SR164a23-b28). As with habits and skills, its acquisition takes time and practice. Like both habits and skills, empeiría is both embodied, gen-

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10 There are other, “milder” forms of epistêmê as well (cf. Eikeland 2008, 69ff).
eral, and generative. We accumulate them, carry them with us, and enact and apply them in new situations. As Aristotle's discussions reveal (Eikeland 2008, 153), experience and habit are produced in similar ways, but experience extracts and retains the cognitive content of habit and habitus without the habitual inclination to act in a particular way. Experience creates know-how and knowledge, inexperi ence indicates a lack of both. As Aristotle says (Metaph 980a28-b27; PoA 99b34-100a4), many other animals share in perception, memory, and imagination, even without lógos, but in acquired practical experience (empeiría) only very little. Animals lacking lógos share only to a small degree in acquired and accumulated experience (metékhei mikrón empeirías). Empeiría, then, requires more lógos than animals normally have. Still, it is the basis for epistêmê. The formulation from the Magna Moralia (MM 1190b30) suggests this process succinctly and better than Metaphysics (Metaph 980a22-982a3) and Posterior Analytics (PoA 99b15-100b17), because it is more consistent with how empeiría is used by both Plato and Aristotle (Eikeland 1998). Epistêmê becomes just that – epistêmê – from grasping the experience based on habit (hê epistêmê ex éthous tên empeirian labousa epistêmê ginetai). Even in the Prior Analytics (PrA 46a3-30), summarizing preceding chapters (PrA 43a20-46a2) on how to seize hold of primary and other premises, Aristotle ends up saying that it belongs to acquired practical experience (empeiría) to deliver the basic principles (arkhai) for each of the disciplines (NE 1142a12-21). The fact, then, is that perception (aísthêsis), opinion (doxa), imagination (phantasia), understanding (sûnesis), scientific knowledge (epistêmê), "intuitive reason" (nous), and in addition experience (empeiría) all "cover the same cognitive ground (tên autên khôran ekhousin)", as he formulates it in the Movement of Animals (MA 700b20).

A similar process from opinion to epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics (PoA 89a17-23, cf. 75b31-33) goes through the process of definition (horismós), and the second faculty or activity of the soul belonging in the gnôristikón department of the soul, and clearly to its theoretical part consisting in lógos activity, is this process of defining (horismós). Aristotle (OtS 407a24-31) states explicitly that the theoretical "department" consists in lógos, and that it has two parts, demonstration (apódeixis) and definition (horismós) (cf. Top 141a5-10). Epistêmê is characterised as a hêxis apodeikitê (demonstrative habitus) by Aristotle (NE 1139b32; cf. PoA 71b18). There is no apódeixis of primary principles or ends, however (PoA 76a31). Hence, in the Posterior Analytics (PoA 99b19, 85a1), Aristotle searches for what kind of habitus (hêxis) that familiarises us (gnôrízousa) with the primary and basic principles. His answer is nous both here and elsewhere (NE 1142a24-30, 1143a35-b6) but it is also induction (epagôgê) (PoA 72b30, 81a38-b9, 87b28-88a8). There is in fact an exten-
sive overlap between many faculties and activities providing us with principles and ends. There is *nous* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1141a8) and *Posterior Analytics* (100b5-16), *empeiría* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE 1142a15-23) and in the *Prior Analytics* (PrA 46a3-30), where we are referred to the *Topica* for elaboration, *dialectics* in the *Topica* (Top 101a36-b4), induction, perception, and habituation again in the *Ethics* (NE 1098b1-6), definition in several places (NE 1098b6; EE1214b6-14, 1218b16-24; PoA 89a17-23; MM1182b30-31), induction and definition in the *Magna Moralia* (MM 1182b17-18), definition again in the *Physics* (Ph 200a34-b9) and, of course, virtue in the *Eudeman* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the *Ethics* (NE 1098b1-6; EE1214b6-27), however, Aristotle reminds us that these apparently different ways of engendering ends and principles, still demand the work of definition to be done carefully. The process of definition overarches and encompasses them all. Hence, as revealed in the *Eudeman Ethics* (EE1218b16-24), teachers do not prove or deliberate ends, they define ends.

As argued extensively in Eikeland (2008, 214-224), it would be reasonable if Aristotle had called *nous* a *héxis horistikê* (defining habitus) or a *héxis epaktikê* (inductive habitus), and as he furthermore points out (ibid., 216, 262), it could just as well be called a *héxis dialektikê* (dialogical habitus) complementary to how he calls *epistêmê* a *héxis apodeiktikê*, since everything in the *Topica*, Aristotle's work on dialectics, also deals with definitions directly or indirectly (Top102b27-103a4). Dialectics is not necessarily conversational, however. It is a "different" thought process. As Eikeland suggests that *nóêsis* – the process of thought and activity of *nous* – should be read as synonymous with dialectics or dialogue in many places (Eikeland 2008, 212ff.). Induction (*epagôgê*), engendering universals from particulars, is also categorized specifically as a form of dialectical argument (*lógos dialektikós*) (Top 105a10-19, 164a13-16, 157a18-21). In *On the Soul* (DA 413a11-21, 402a11-22; cf. Ph 184a10-b14) the process of engendering universals from particulars is called *lógos horistikós*, a defining argumentation (cf. Metaph 1063b8-15; Top101a38-b2; PrA43a36-39; Ph200a34-b9), starting from vague but more apparent things, gradually clarifying and revealing, connecting to important distinctions between what is more knowable to us and in itself (PoA 71b35-72a5) (Eikeland 1997, 2008, 83-84). Almost all Aristotle's inquiries start in this way from what is more knowable to us (Ph184a10-b14 and more), a process he calls a different but not absolute form of proof (*hetéra apódeixis*) (PoA 72b32). It certainly is where to start in ethics (NE1095b1-4, 1098b9-12; EE1216b26-40). As argued extensively

11 Although Aristotle finds it reasonable to talk about separate parts of the soul and mind according to their different functions, activities, ends, and results, he concludes that they are very difficult and even absurd (*átopon*) to hold separate in OtS432a23-b7, 411b5-31, NE1102a30-34, and EE1219b32-1220a3 (see also OtS426b23-427a15, 430b5-6, 433a22, and 433b10-12).
in Eikeland (2008, 205-299), this "different way" of clarifying ends and principles is clearly dialectical, not by merely reasoning syllogistically from accepted opinions (ex endoxa) but by going critically through them (dia endoxon) sorting differences and similarities (tas doxas episkopein / exetazein) (NE1095a28, EE1214b28, 1215a6, 1217b16, Top101b4). The most important and proper task of dialectics, or dialogue, is said explicitly to be apprehending the primary principles of each discipline and each kind of activity. Dialogue is called the way (hê hodös) to arrive at basic principles in all inquiries (Top 101a37-b4, PoA84b24). Dialectics discusses and defines ends (telê) and aims (skopoi). Aristotle gives one among several summaries of this dialectical way towards ends and principles at the beginning of Book III (B) in the Metaphysics (Metaph 995a24-b4; cf. Eikeland 2008, 255f). The gradual and dialectical task of defining, then, transforms, grasps, and guides conceptually by means of lógos, what gets formed and moulded into patterns subconsciously through repetitions by the part of soul able to listen and follow reason (tò álogan), i.e. by habits, skills, emotions, desires, and actions. As the Ethics states, the form and content of the álogan part of the soul, the middle ground between mind and matter, can be modified by lógos. Dialogue does it.

The real virtue question, then, concerns what must be an overlap of habit and habitus with elements in this cognitive capacity. The relationship between hēxis and empeiría is a key. Empeiría extracts the cognitive content from hēxis without the habitual inclination as indicated in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE 1116b3-23). As indicated above, and in contrast to most other concepts of experience, the practically acquired concept of empeiría is not merely a perceptual confrontation with particulars. It results in a general ability to act, a general pattern in itself, even before it is elaborated by lógos, which even animals take part in to a small extent. The process of defining transforms both empeiría and opinion into epistêmê. Experience may be said to be the basis for epistêmê, têkhnê, and virtue. But virtue is even less than the two others, reducible to mere cognitive empeiría. This is why it needs to be established as a firm habitus (NE 1100b11-17), i.e. as a spontaneous inclination to act in a certain way e.g. courageously with conviction and understanding, not merely as a trained and experienced, but still possibly egotistical and cowardly ability to recognize danger approaching, and then run away. Even more than the others, ethical virtue needs a deep understanding and conviction. It must know, understand, and be able to justify the ethical correctness of its own acts. Virtue is right and adequate skill, attitude, will, and understanding united. As indicated, every virtue is the result of a process of perfection (teleiôsis) from within a specific practice, starting inchoately, and resulting in a certain virtuous habitus. According to the Metaphysics (Metaph 1051a24-33), nóësis, i.e. critical dialogue, always accompanies and guides the actualizing development from dúnamis to ènérgeia. This is the way virtues are developed. Dialogue mediates between the partly
rational and completely rational parts, bringing them into the realm of lógos. Modernised, we might say that critical dialogue "theorizes" the pre-rational but still cognitive patterns generated "inductively" through repetitious activity as habit and experience. Hence, as Aristotle says, there is no deliberation (boûleusis) about ends and principles as there is no demonstration (apódeixis) but there certainly is a lógos of a different kind, a dialectical, defining lógos (horistikós). Phrónēsis presupposes the other ethical virtues as inclinations to do good. It is part of the "Ausübung" of virtue. Dialogue does not presuppose them, however, but fosters, cultivates, and defines them as based in and springing from the álogon part of the soul. Dialectics is part of their "Einübung".

As the evidence above makes plausible and indicated by Eikeland's further discussion (2008, 287-290) of how Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics provides even inferior states like self-control and unrestraint with nous, virtue or even imperfect characters cannot be merely non-rational, perceptive cognitive faculties of the soul, the way Moss concludes (Moss 2011, 252; idem 2014, 222). Virtue as the result of a "non-rational upbringing and character" (Moss 2014, 234) is insufficient. This becomes even more clear from Aristotle's discussion of how the personal acquisition of epistêmê as a power or potential ( dúnamis) with lógos is the basis for freedom and autonomy by distinguishing this from non-rational potentials (állogoi dunámeis) and habituated inclinations (héxeis) as powers without lógos on the other (Metaph 1046a36-b28, 1050b28-35, 1051a4-22, 1047b31-1048a24; NE1129a12-23; EE 1227a23-b5). Non-rational potentials without lógos can only produce one kind of result or calculable, one-dimensional results with limited variation, and habituation without some form of guidance can go in any direction. Potentials having lógos can produce opposite and contrary effects (in medicine, both health and unhealth). They thereby create space for desire and deliberate choice (órexin é prohaíresin), i.e. freedom (Metaph1048a8-11). Lógos brings out and articulates the diverse potentials of things, and can rationally and by choice produce opposite results from the same basic principles (apo tês autês arkhês / mia gàr arkhê periékhetai) (Metaph 1046b7-28, 1065b23-1066a7; Ph 201a30-b15; EE 1222b41-42). For rational potentials to be realised, then, ethical virtues, desire, deliberation, and deliberate choice – what moves us – become necessary. Epistemic knowing liberates the knower and makes autonomy possible (OtS 429b3-10).

The Movement of Animals (700b25, OtS433a11-13) states explicitly that the end for praxeis (tò tôn praktôn télos) is provided by the objects of desire and thought (tò orektôn kai tò dianoêtón). The challenge of deliberate choice (prohaíresis) is to make them coincide (Eikeland 2008, 115-121). For Aristotle, the virtues coincide with the pragmata (die Sachen) as "ideal" standards attracting us erotically (Eikeland 2008, 196-205). The gradually developed and acquired praxis or performance of a pragma is identical to the praxis of
virtue: its specific virtue (NE 1098a8-17; EE 1219a18-23). And any activity, "thing", or habitus is perfected when it achieves its proper virtue through a process of perfection (Ph 246a10-b2). We all start out in life as inchoate and undefined (aóristoi) (Eikeland 2008, 178, 246f.). The personal acquisition of skill and virtue – gradually better adjusted to different pragmata – is the process of definition. In this process, theoretical reason and practical reason are united. The process of habituation (ethismós) resembles not only induction but also the process of defining (horismós), sorting similarities and differences. For Aristotle (NE 1170a16-25; EE 1244b35-1245a11), to take part personally in what is truly and pragmatically defined (hôrisménon), is to arrive at what is good, i.e. at a life perfectly or optimally adjusted to the pragmata as they really are (Prot26b-d). Thus, to be personally defined is not at all to be arbitrarily "framed" or determined from the outside. It is to reach perfection from the inside at the end of the way of praxis. It is to enter the figure of virtue (arêtes skhêma) (MM 1183b25-27; Metaph 1050a8-b6).

My conclusion here, then, is that the gnôristikón or kritikón – the cognitive or distinguishing – part of the soul clearly provides deliberation with ends (telê) and aims (skopoi). This far Moss and I seem to agree. But this it is not provided merely by the part without lógos, and hardly at all, or only as starting points, without the involvement of lógos. Definition elaborates, transforms, extracts, and articulates the pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic patterns of the cognitive soul into powers with lógos, i.e. epistêmê, tékhnê, and ethical virtue. Habituation as the process of engendering a virtuous habitus through repetitions and practice, then, needs guidance in order to aim well (NE 1103b13; EE 1220b2). It needs teachers. But neither teachers nor anyone else prove or deliberate ends. They do not instruct ends and principles didactically. They define them (EE 1218b16-24), and dialectics defines.

Finally, this becomes even more obvious when we see what Aristotle himself does in his ethical writings. Aristotle is a teacher, and the theoretical task of defining ends and principles – the what it is (ti estin, ti èn einai) of happiness and all the virtues – is clearly what Aristotle is doing in the Ethics. Although the purpose of the Ethics is to promote ethical excellence, this is done by providing knowledge (gnôsis) of the target (skopós) to aim at (NE 1094a23-27). Aristotle discusses the question of "what-it-is" (ti estin) concerning virtues (NE1105b19, 1107a7-8, 1117b21-22), a necessary theoretical task in order to find the télos of praxis (NE 1094a19; EE 1216b35-40). Hence, after the discussion with the technical arts, Aristotle starts directly with the theoretical task of defining virtue (NE 1105b19, 1106a13, 1107a1-8, 1109b20-22, 1109b3, 1114b26-30; cf. Pol 1332a22), and he does it as an ethical "architect" or constructor of principles (NE 1094a6-b12, 1152b1-5) and as a teacher (Eikeland 2008, 292-298).
Clearly, then, Kristjansson (2014), attacking the question of ethics from a totally different angle, is right in claiming that dialogue is not merely a Socratic method of moral education abandoned by Aristotle. It is equally and essentially Aristotelian. But Kristjansson (2014, 343-347) uses only what we might call "external" and indirect evidence from how the *Ethics* describe tasks of friendship. Eikeland (2008, 399ff.) uses the same evidence in conjunction with the internal, theoretical and methodological evidence outlined above, and the evidence from the *Topica* (Top 159a25-38, 161a20-27 and a36-b10, 163a29; cf. SR171b3-172a2) to show how what Aristotle calls dialogical gatherings or *dialektikai sunôdoi* play a most central role in both ethics and politics (*paideia*). Different purposes are distinguished. Rhetorical or eristic gatherings for fighting and competing (*agônos khárın*) are clearly different from properly dialectical gatherings for the sake of training and experimentation (*gummasías kai peîras hêneka*), experience and inquiry (*peîras kai skêpeôs khárın*), exercise and study (*gummasian kai melêtên*), or teaching and learning (*didaskalia kai máthêsis*). Dialectical gatherings are constituted by a common task (*koinón érgon*) of better understanding, deeper insight, and shared truth, where no one wins while others lose, but all win better understanding, etc. or all lose by not achieving it. According to the *Nichomachean Ethics* (NE 1100b19-20, cf. NE1179b1-4, PrA43a20-24), the happy individual (*ho eudaímôn*) spends all or most of her time alternately performing and studying (*práxei kai theôrései*) the activities according to virtue or excellence, placing the dialogical way (*hodós*) towards a virtuous life individually and collectively, presumably in dialectical gatherings, at the centre of practical ethics and politics. Kristjansson (ibid.) argues against others who find it necessary to use non-Aristotelian sources to supplement Aristotle with dialogue. My comment is that the internal evidence for Aristotle as a dialectician is much stronger than Kristjansson presents.

My claim then is, that what I have outlined above – the way or *hê hodós* from *dúnamis* to *entelêkeia* and *enérgeia* through *praxis*, *empeiría*, and dialogue – is what Aristotle aims at when he says that *lógos* and *nous* are the *télos* for human development (Pol1334b14-28); it is how and why we need *phúsis*, *éthos*, and *lógos* to become virtuous (*spoudaíos*) (Pol1332a36-b7), and why the goodness of individuals is judged according to both the part of the soul having *lógos* and the part able to follow *lógos* (Pol 1333a16-20). The whole process outlined above is what Aristotle calls "the principle, or starting point, of science", *arkhê epistêmês* (PoA 72b25, 100b15), "the way towards the principles in every investigation" (*hê prós tás hapasôn tôn methódôn hódos*).

This is also, why even Jessica Moss, despite her fruitful starting points and effective refutation of the dominant view's overburdening of *phrônêsis*, ends up as misrepresenting Aristotle. In spite of her final discouragement of any further inquiry from where her discus-
sion stops then, halfway to the finishing line: "if this is not enough to save Aristotle from the charge of Humeanism, then we should not bother trying to save him from that charge" (Moss 2014, 240), I think, to really save Aristotle from Hume, we need to go all the way to the end (as Eikeland 2008 does), to where the way itself (hê hodôs) appears to us as the ultimate virtuous end.

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