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# (Black) Non-Analysis: From the Restrained Unconscious to the Generalized Unconscious

#### Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the ongoing studies revolving around the fields of Afro-Pessimism and Non-Philosophy. It is focused mostly on a short essay that Francois Laruelle wrote in 1989 called "The Concept of Generalized Analysis or 'Non-Analysis" that eventually became part of a larger work called Theorie des Etrangers, while also drawing on the latter for support. The focus is set not in terms of exegesis or commentary but in tandem with the work of Frank Wilderson III to borrow from both of their works and formulate a move from the "White restrained Unconscious" to the "(Black) generalized Unconscious". In the first section I articulate Laruelle and Wilderson's critiques of the common-sense image of the Unconscious. And in the second section I make the move from the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious by arguing that the former is embedded within a metaphysical sovereignty of desires that excludes (Black) desires. The "White restrained Unconscious" is constituted by what Laruelle calls a "half loss" or a loss which loses itself. For this reason the (Black) generalized Unconscious cannot appear within it, for it is an absolute loss, or what Laruelle calls the Joui-sans-Jouissance. The White generalized Unconsicous blocks (Black) loss out by a transference mechanism. The opening up of the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious which is its Identity in the last instance can only be done by "ending the World". Using Jared Sexton's notion of the "social life of social death" I show that this desire to end the world allows for a seeing from perspective of the "One" which is the subject position of the (Black) Non-Analyst and allows for a dualysis of the desires of the White restrained Unconscious.

Keywords: Laruelle, afro-pessimism, (black) non-analysis, generalized unconscious, loss

## The Critique of the Restrained Unconscious in Laruelle and Wilderson III

"What is missing in African-American cultural analysis is a concept of the 'one'" Hortense Spillers (Spillers 1997, 140)

So imagine the following scenario: a white analysand is free-associating on the word 'black' before his black analyst. He is embarrassed because he can only think of negative words and mental associations; for some unknown reason, the word doesn't seem to conjure up any positive quality. Despite his attempts at repressing it, the word 'nig-

ger' urges itself to the forefront of his mind, refusing to go away. He utters it, conscious of his own spiteful fury and with as much venom as he can muster-he has never, to his knowledge, used this word before. The analyst shows no response. Now even more embarrassingly conscious of his own stupid blind, and violently impotent rage, the anlysand thinks of another phrase: 'black nigger'. The association seems right; it seems to fit (despite himself), and what is more, it seems to mean something, but is not a phrase the analysand wants to utter here. He utters the word 'death' instead-a classic association, so banal in its obviousness, but reassuring nonetheless. The analyst nods with obvious enthusiasm and urges him to continue. (Marriott 2007, 223)

In a short essay entitled "The Concept of Generalized Analysis or 'Non-Analysis'," Francois Laruelle attempts to move from the conception of a "restrained Unconscious" to that of a "generalized Unconscious". The restrained Unconscious is defined by its invariant syntax of a Philosophical Decision of the unity of contraries of the One and the Dyad. It has "an amphibological appearance, the appearance of the identity or sameness of the Other. Between the Other who is (that of the Greco-metaphysical decision) and the Other who 'is' not (that of Judaism), there is an appearance of identity reduced to its most empirical forms or data". (Laruelle 1989, 508)<sup>1</sup> The Greco-metaphysical decision is a manifestation of Consciousness, or the "Self" whereas the "Other" represents the Judaic turn, representative of the Unconscious. In other words, the restrained Unconscious remains a firmly metaphysical or ontological entity. Where there should be One, Laruelle posits, this Philosophical Decision in the restrained Unconscious (consisting of the Greek Consciousness and the Judaic Unconscious) performs its philosophical division or rending in a "resistance (my italics) to the destruction of decision by an affect (of) the Other that risked being stronger than it" (Laruelle 1989, 508) Laruelle articulates an "enlarged or generalized concept of resistance," (Laruelle 1989, 513) which is the resistance that the restrained Unconscious or the everyday unconscious of the collective/individual has to the One, by hierarchizing one part of the Dyad, the Other of the Unconscious. This resistance is a resistance to the One, or the Stranger (to be discussed in the section on (Black) Non-Analysis).

Frank Wilderson III similarly provides a critique of the Unconscious that echoes the move from the restrained Unconscious to the generalized Unconscious in his book *Red*,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> All translations of Laruelle's "Le Concept d'Analyse Generalisée ou de 'Non-Analyse'" were made by consulting the original text as well as Taylor Adkin's translation on his blog. See Taylor Adkins, "Translation of Laruelle's 'The Concept of Generalized Analysis or of 'Non-Analysis," *Speculative Heresy*, June 15, 2013. Web. <a href="https://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/2013/06/15/translation-of-laruelles-the-concept-of-generalized-analysis-or-of-non-analysis/">https://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/2013/06/15/translation-of-laruelles-the-concept-of-generalized-analysis-or-of-non-analysis/>.

Black and White: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. Here, Wilderson makes a distinction between (White) Humans and (Blacks)<sup>2</sup> based on a fundamental antagonism. The violence done to (Blacks) is of the order of an ontological violence while, the violence done to those who are Human are merely "contingent conflicts" that Humans inflict on each other. They are "little family quarrels" of Whiteness.

Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black's first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, 'wiped out [his or her] metaphysics . . . his [or her] customs and sources on which they are based.' Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust. That is why it makes little sense to attempt analogy: the Jews have the Dead (the Muselmann) among them; the Dead have the Blacks among them. (Wilderson 2010, 38)

The very appearance of (Blacks) in the World is always-already an Anti-Black ontological violence or as Calvin Warren calls it "onticide," a "certain murderous operation through ontology." (Warren 2017, 407) since the being of the Slave is that of "social death" or the complete loss of kinship ties. Because of this metaphysical devastation there is thus a "ruse of analogy" between (Blacks) and Humans. As Wilderson argues, "No slave, no world. And in Addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is *in* the world. (Wilderson 2010, 11) (Blacks) cannot *appear* in the World. Humans have the privilege of metaphysical sovereignty and while violence can be done to a Jew, a Jew still has metaphysics, i.e. is still a White Human. The World, or ontology is constitutive of the erasure of (Blackness). This places the figure of the Slave as that by which the World parasites off of, and *enjoys* its metaphysical sovereignty. The Slave is the condition of the possibility of the World.

I would like to argue that Wilderson's ontological "ruse of analogy" carries over into the distinction between Laruelle's restrained Unconscious and the generalized. There is a ruse of analogy between the (Black) Unconscious and the White Unconscious. In his chapter on "The Narcissistic Slave" Wilderson still ascribes to a *restrained view of the Unconscious*. For Wilderson, the restrained Unconscious, synonymous with Lacanian analysis, is a (White) Human Unconscious in which (Black) speech is barred. For Wilderson, (Black-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Here and throughout the rest of this paper, I adopt Anthony Paul Smith's grapheme of (Black) in parentheses that he utilizes in his book *Laruelle: A Stranger Thought* to indicate that (Blackness) does not appear within the World but is akin to Laruelle's Victim-in-Person. Of this grapheme, Smith says, "it relates fundamentally to the way, within the white world of philosophy the (Black) functions both as a blind spot, and as the structural negation of the human as philosophically overdetermined." (Smith 2016, 112)

ness) occupies the violently excluded Real of this Lacanian Unconscious. In this guise, Wilderson still subscribes to what Laruelle calls the restrained Unconscious, insofar as it is an Unconscious that is metaphysically sovereign, the only Unconscious that exists. However, a move to the generalized Unconscious asks what a (Black) desire "murdered" within ontology is like, and attempts to expand the Unconscious. It is important to make the distinction that the (restrained) Unconscious as such is White and not that White Humans have an Unconscious that is distinct from that of empirically black-skinned individuals. Everyone has a White Unconscious insofar as it is a restrained structure that partakes of the metaphysical sovereignty of the White Human. Indeed, as Frantz Fanon wrote of his Martinician compatriots, they underwent a "hallucinatory whitening (Fanon 2008, 80)" or an unconscious desire to be white. For Laruelle, this partakes of a Black/White Dyad that still belongs to the realm of metaphysical sovereignty or the philosophical decision. However, the ontological-psychoanalytic resistance that Laruelle argues that the restrained Unconscious has to the generalized Unconscious is synonymous with the resistance that a White Unconscious has to a (Black) Unconscious. This is a resistance to the One. While in restrained psychoanalysis, resistance is the defense of the ego to avow repressed memories or trauma, Laruelle's concept of a generalized resistance is a defense on the part of the White restrained Unconscious or the White Human to avow the trauma of what Laruelle calls the Stranger or the Victim-in-Person. This takes into account not only the individual's history, but the lived history of the World. Thus, Wilderson's ontological critique must be brought into his critique of the Unconscious. There is a ruse of analogy between the (Black) Unconscious and the White Unconscious.

I will therefore use the terms "White restrained Unconscious" and "(Black) generalized Unconscious" to denote Laruelle's movement from the restrained Unconscious to the generalized Unconscious in tandem with the necessity of the movement from a White Unconscious to a (Black) Unconscious. This move does not argue that all White Humans are hiding a (Black) Unconscious behind their White restrained Unconscious. It rather argues that the conception and science of the Unconscious hitherto formulated has been restrained by the structures of a White metaphysical sovereignty and can only articulate the restricted losses and desires of such a sovereignty. This is simultaneously a metaphysical and political critique. For Lacan, analysis consists of getting the analysand to become conscious of his or her relations with Others, synonymous to a kind of alienation. Wilderson's critique of metaphysics is simultaneously one of Civil Society that repeats itself in the Lacanian Symbolic.

The Other that Lacan speaks of, he says, are none other, "in the vernacular most salient to the Slave, Whites and their junior partners in civil society-Humans positioned by the Symbolic order" (Wilderson 2010, 70). The way Civil Society functions is via the metaphysical sovereignty of the White Human and the social death of the (Black) as outlined above. Further, the Symbolic order of the White restrained Unconscious functions similarly as constituting the desires of (Blackness) as socially dead or unable to appear.

Partly at issue here is that under the White restrained Unconscious the only subject that can have losses and desires are those that fall under the subject-positions of the Greek Conscious or the Judaic Other, or the Self/Other dynamic. While Laruelle uses the "Judaic turn" to denote a specific turn within philosophy that takes account of the Other, and not a racialization of philosophy, it is nevertheless the case that what counts as "Other" in this Judaic turn is a question of the Human, i.e. the one who has metaphysics. As Anthony Paul Smith notes, Laruelle's discussion of Judaic thought emphasizes how philosophers like Levinas and Derrida carry out a Judaic turn in philosophy and "their act of resistance to philosophy ends up as susceptible to capture and colonization (my italics) by philosophy." (Smith 2016, 99) For Wilderson, the White Other falls squarely within the policing of Philosophy and Civil Society and it ultimately fails by providing an inept structure of the Unconscious Other by resisting (Blackness) or the One. The Judaic Other provides a picture of mere contingent conflicts, mere family squabbles. Not only does the Unconscious come out as Conscious, and (White) Humans as Human, but (Blackness) comes out as White. The Unconscious is not deep enough, not dark enough. It is too White.

The metaphysical hierarchization between the Greek Consciousness and Judaic Unconscious must then cede to (Blackness) as a generalized Unconscious. The resistance that the restrained Unconscious has to the generalized Unconscious is a resistance of White Unconscious to (Blackness). For Laruelle, non-analysis, "is a way of taking up the problems of the world, of history, of philosophy, rather than those of simple consciousness as psychoanalysis does, but it is a way of taking them up which has some relationship with psychoanalysis." (Laruelle 2015a, 43) This is not to deny that there have been formulations of the White restrained Unconscious and psychoanalysis that take into account the collective unconscious, anthropology, and epiphylogenesis among other things. Rather to take account of the "problems of the world" in non-analysis is to take into account the desires and losses of those who do not *appear* within the confines of simple consciousness. Here, I endorse Anthony Paul Smith's articulation of the Stranger-Subject or Victim-in-Person as (Black) "to indicate that

the identity is not given by the world, that this suspended identity is precisely closer to the Human-in-Human than the white human of philosophy. (Smith 2016, 116) Moving to the (Black) generalized Unconscious will allow for a "dualysis of restrained analysis" (Laruelle 1989, 514) in the or the White Unconscious in the Laruellian sense by transforming it into the material for analysis itself. This allows for an immanent (non)-analysis of the White restrained Unconscious by the (Black) generalized Unconscious. The (Black) generalized Unconscious functions by suspending the desires and objects of the White restrained Unconscious, and while not negating them, place them into reconsideration. (Blackness) or the "(subject) of science is the veritable 'analyst' in what we call 'non'-analysis'. This is an Unconscious without metaphysics, or a (Black) Non-Analysis.

### Transference of Restrained Losses and the End of the World

There is a resistance of the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious that is simultaneously a resistance to the One. What is this resistance and what does it entail? Wilderson argues that there is a "structural adjustment" or a move on the part of the Humans of Civil Society to force (Blackness) against its will to appear in the White restrained Unconscious as another member of Civil Society. In an interview conducted after the incidents in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 and the shooting with Michael Brown, Wilderson says,

Policing—policing Blackness—is what keeps everyone else sane. And if we can start to see the policing and the mutilation and the aggressivity towards Blackness not as a form of discrimination, but as being a form of psychic health and well-being for the rest of the world, then we can begin to reformulate the problem and begin to take a much more iconoclastic response to it. (Wilderson 2014, 7)

There is a way in which repressing or resisting (Blackness) allows one to keep one's sanity or mental health. This is because "normally people are not radical, normally people are not moving against the system: normally people are just trying to live, to have a bit of romance and to feed their kids." (Wilderson 2014, 9) Normal issues such as sanity, eating, loving, feeding kids, typical psychoanalytic issues, are ways of sublimating the fact of (Blackness), ways of policing (Blackness). These are ways of violently forcing (Blackness) to appear in the White restrained Unconscious. We can speak of this as another form of the ontological murder of (Blackness), except this time as the ontological murder of (Black) desires. Within

the confines of normal desires, (Black) desires appear as always-already lost. As Jared Ball says, "it's almost like we need to reach out to find people around to the world to link up with. And then unfortunately we're let down when their anti-Blackness takes hold again (Wilderson 2014, 16)". The Others of Civil Society only partner up with (Blacks) until the "normal desires" of the former are attained and then Anti-Blackness as an attitude or a mode of "collective unconscious" takes hold again.

(Blackness) appears as the means by which desires in the White restrained Unconscious are able to take object-form. As Wilderson argues, "As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, the Black is vulnerable to the whims of the world, and so is his or her cultural 'production'." (Wilderson 2010, 56) (Blackness) thus appears alienated in the World in the object-form that White desires take. These desires can desire things that are lost in the World, but they can never desire and take into account losses and desires are constitutively excluded from appearing among the things of the World. There is a difference of kind between (Black) desire and White desire. The latter appear as "normal desires" because they are a priori attainable or achievable in the "thought-world." They are thought to be attainable because they are desires in the World. As Wilderson reminds us, however, "No slave, no world. And in Addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. (Wilderson 2010, 11) This is a matter of desire that is intrinsic to the structure of the Unconscious. Wilderson notes this split subjectivity within himself when he says "But my huge weight fluctuation doesn't mean that when I'm thin and sick, that the world has gotten better for me as a Black person. I have to keep reminding myself that I am struggling for something for which there is no coherent articulation (Wilderson 2014, 16-17)". While the things of the World may appear as desires for Wilderson, they are but sublimated desires, repressed desires enacting an ontological ruse of analogy between normal desires and (Black) desires. This ruse is between desires that are within and outside the World.

This split subjectivity reveals itself in the utter ineptitude of the concept of loss in the White restrained Unconscious. Losses are typically imagined in terms of objects (in the World) whether imagined or real. If you imagine food as possible outcome of your actions it is not necessarily the case that you will receive it, and you will experience it as a present loss. Moreover, if you are given food, you will experience the possible future attainability or non-attainability as loss. This twofold structure of givenness and possibility is emblematic of the White restrained Unconscious and the Philosophical Decision. It is for this reason that Laruelle argues that the "normal desires" that Wilderson claims are part of a collective "libidinal

economy" that gravitate around anti-Blackness partake of a "loss that a first time belongs to the structure and defines itself by the order of the signifier, then realizes itself a second time in the phantasmatic and imaginary modes, straight from the real." (Laruelle 1995, 281) For Laruelle, the restrained Unconscious is constituted by a twofold loss which is constitutive of metaphysics itself or the dynamic of the Greek Self and Judaic Other. The White restrained Unconscious because is always defined by a twofold loss. This is to say that the White restrained Unconscious desires things that always lost twice, and so these things are never fully attainable. If only given, the possible is always a loss, and if only possible, the given is always a loss. This double loss is a loss that loses itself within the Greco-Judaic structure. The White restrained Unconscious is not in fact determined by loss as such, the loss of the World but by the loss of particular things within the World. This inept concept of loss structures the White restrained Unconscious and so "restrained analysis conceals the unbearable quality of absolute loss (Laruelle 1989, 516)". No wonder that (Black) desires cannot appear within the White restrained Unconscious since what Laruelle is arguing in tandem with Wilderson is that loss does not belong to the White restrained Unconscious. The White restrained Unconscious has no identity because it constantly loses itself in things or what it calls its normal desires. Normal desires are but an inept concept of loss.

However, what defines the (Black) generalized Unconscious is a different kind of loss that functions by a unilateral duality that allows one to see the double losses of the White restrained Unconscious as determined in the last instance by an immanent loss. If (Blackness) is always already defined by loss within the framework of ontology, then the Unconscious of (Blackness) which is (Blackness) outside the confines of ontology would be, as David Marriott puts it in his book Haunted Life, the need to deal with the "loss of loss". In short the (Black) generalized Unconscious appears as lost within metaphysical sovereignty because the White restrained Unconscious forces the former to lose itself. It acts through the notion of of transference or the "bending-back [of] the unilaterality (of) the Unconscious through an imaginary identification that is also a denial of the subject (of) science." (Laruelle 1989, 516) The subject of science here is the (Black) analyst. Denying the "loss of a loss" the White restrained Unconscious attempts to project onto the (Black) generalized Unconscious a loss that loses itself, wherein the (Black) generalized Unconscious can no longer identify itself. The White restrained Unconscious refuses to take the analyst's desires into consideration and instead "bends-back" the strict unilaterality of the Victim-in-Person in order to project its Imaginary desires onto the analyst. As Laruelle says of the Victim-in-Person in General Theory of Victims, "the victim is twice victim, once as wronged in a criminal act, and a second time by effacement, albeit legally of the injury that had been suffered, an effacement whose publicity offends the victim (Laruelle 2015b, 64)". The ontological murder of (Blackness) is the first victimization by ontology and the second is the *misrepresentation of the victim*, the effacement of his desires by those who represent him. Transference thus acts as a re-iteration of the primal scene of ontological victimization, a repetition compulsion. The (Black) analyst here must teach the White analysand to overcome this repetition-compulsion.

The White restrained Unconscious must overcome this repetition-compulsion in order to acknowledge the desires of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. To see this another way Laruelle says that "[Restrained] analysis can only go as far as a half-loss, only going up to the mid-reunion.<sup>3</sup> (Laruelle 1995, 202) And it is this half-loss that is the transference of White desires onto the (Black) generalized Unconscious. It is the White restrained Unconscious telling the latter that all its losses and desires fall under the category of "normal desires". From this perspective there are no (Black) desires. It is not the case of these double losses that they are so absolute. Rather they are double, because they can never be attained and the loss loses itself all over again. They can never be attained because the loss is not immanent, it is not lost enough. The White restrained Unconscious has not lost enough. (Black) loss does not appear in the concept of White loss for the very reason that the latter does not exist. White loss only keeps losing itself. (Black) loss is already murdered within the metaphysical dictates of the Greek Self and Judaic Other of the White restrained Unconscious. There is then a ruse of analogy or philosophical decision made between the losses of the White restrained Unconscious and the (Black) generalized Unconscious. There is a "structural adjustment" that functions by making the "loss of loss" appear like "half-losses". The latter represses the former, which would be the end of the World as ontological field. As Laruelle argues, "The World is the Authority of Authorities, whereas the One defines the order of Minorities or Strangers." (Laruelle 2013, 168) The World is the authority on desires, creating the realm of normal desires between the Self and Other. Similarly, because the desires of the White restrained Unconscious take place in the World, these normal desires pathologize absolute loss as too radical, too (Black), too much a movement to a loss that is One. But a (Black) non-analysis attempts to put an end to the plane of half-loss itself, by "trying to destroy the world." (Wilderson 2014, 20) This is an attempt to destroy the World as the plane of realizability on which desires can occur. Daniel Colucciello Barber argues that the world is also given twice, the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> All translations of Laruelle's *Theorie des Etrangers* are my own.

"world-as-given *and* the world-as-possible," (Barber 183) and that the essential structure of analogy is this given twiceness. Connecting these themes to post-secularism and Afro-Pessimism, he argues that the World would then be the ruse of analogy, or the very ruse of ontological appearance. I would like to further add that the World is a ruse of the White restrained Unconscious. The World is the plane on which the double losses of the White restrained Unconscious occur. The question of the (Black) generalized Unconscious would be that of withdrawing libidinal investment in the World and the normal desires that adhere to it always-already murder (Black) desires. The opening up of the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious would be the desire to end the World.

### (Black) Non-Analysis

The movement to the (Black) generalized Unconsicous proceeds from the recognition of the desire to end the World. The end of the World opens up the way to the generalized Unconscious and the conception of an absolute loss. Laruelle identifies the position of the generalized Unconscious in the following way:

The generalized Unconscious is the affect (of) loss, the a priori but immanent phenomenon (of) a loss without object. Loss lived as such by the subject rather than a loss affecting a subject. And if loss is an absolute and positive affect where "nothing", neither object nor world, neither being nor Being is lost, it signifies that there is nothing to retrieve or make return. There is a jouissance itself (of) loss, a non-thetic jouissance of the Unconscious where all is suspended without having to return and is thus lived in an immanent way in conformity with what is specific to man's essence. (Laruelle 1989, 518)

This is very similar to what Jared Sexton outlines as the "social life of social death":

[Afro-pessimism] is a willing or willingness, in other words, to pay whatever social costs accrue to being black, to inhabiting blackness, to living a black social life under the shadow of social death...The affirmation of blackness, which is to say an affirmation of pathological being is a refusal to distance oneself from blackness in a valorization of minor differences that bring one closer to health, to life, or to sociality. (Sexton 2011, 27)

For Laruelle, the generalized Unconscious is constituted by an absolute loss. But this absolute loss, because it is absolute, must itself be lived in joy. This loss never loses itself. It never loses itself in a need to be re-found elsewhere in the White restrained Unconscious.

It never needs to be re-found, re-attained, re-achieved. And because it never loses itself, it is lived as immanent Identity. As Katerina Kolozova argues, "In non-philosophy, enjoyment and suffering no longer establish opposition. They are both instances of the lived, of the sheer experience that takes place as 'suffering'...One is subjected to a sensation, be it pleasure or pain, which place in the defenseless body through the instance of pure exposure or vulnerability (Kolozova 96)". This what in *Theorie des Etrangers* Laruelle calls Joui-sans-Jouissance, or the simultaneous lived experience of joy and pain without having to search for a jouissance that loses itself in an object. He says, "Joui is a stranger to the philosophical Ego, to the subject as "individual", always already divided, mixed eventually by jouissance in its philosophico-analytic concept (Laruelle 1995, 222)". Jouissance here denotes for Laruelle a divided enjoyment, one that was outlined by the concept of the double loss, an enjoyment that is always attenuated by a further loss. Joui, however, is without object. Similarly, Sexton argues that

Fanon says that he wants to liberate the black man from himself, not repair his self-esteem or correct his misguided worldview or reacquaint him with some traditional way of life—not to heal him, but to liberate him. And liberation does not mean (only) to return the fruits of his formerly exploited labor or (only) to return the sovereignty of his people over their formerly colonized land or (only) to return control over the uses of his formerly enslaved body. Those are the external conditions, as it were. He must (also) be liberated from himself, from his self, from his desiring self. (Sexton 2017)

Because (Blackness) is already alienated and murdered in the World, to liberate the (Black) man from himself is not to return or re-find any *external object* of loss, but rather to destroy the field onto which (Blackness) ends up being projected, so that (Blackness) can enjoy itself as Joui-sans-Jouissance. The move to the (Black) generalized Unconscious is thus a conception of identification with itself in the last instance and a liberation of the (Black) man from himself. What Laruelle calls the Joui-sans-Jouissance is an immanent loss and affirmation, the experience of the (Black) self as such beyond historical and ontological transcendence, but nevertheless taking these transcendences into account, whether through the Middle Passage, on the auction block, or during the recent shootings in Ferguson, Missouri. As Sexton further argues, "separation, as psychoanalysis has shown powerfully, is a precondition for any relationship whatsoever." (Sexton 2017) The (Black) generalized Unconscious is not constituted by any *particular* losses, desires, or separations. What constitutes the (Black) generalized Unconscious is not separation or loss of the mother, of a

native land, of property, or of any external factors. It is constituted by ontological loss or the very fact of loss and separation in and of themselves, the fact of social death and slavery. As such, the willingness to pay *whatever*, *any and all*, *past and future* social costs there are to being (Black) and affirming them is perhaps the necessity of formulating a (Black) generalized Unconscious. Moreover, if it is loss and separation themselves that belong to the (Black) generalized Unconscious, then there is an absolute jouissance of loss. Because this loss can never be realized in an object, there is nothing to regain. What belongs to the (Black) generalized Unconscious is immanent Identity itself. Such an immanent Identity is the domain of *freedom*. This Identity and desire is a separation from all transcendence, especially the World, since (Blackness) has never belonged to the World.

The subject of this immanent identity and this beginning point of freedom can be thought of as the (Black) non-analyst. Why the (Black) non-analyst? Laruelle says, "The subject (of) science is the veritable "analyst" in what we will call "non-analysis", and there is only a non-analyst who identifies itself with this subject and its immanent posture." (Laruelle 1989, 516) There is no analytic scene of analyst and analysand in Laruelle's nonanalysis. However, the (Black) non-analyst here is the immanent identity of the White restrained Unconscious. It is the (Black) non-analyst to whom loss belongs to as Identity. The former sees from the perspective of the Vision-in-One. The "end of the World" as outlined by Afro-Pessimism can be thought of as the means by which the (Black) non-analyst works on the transcendental material of the White restrained Unconscious from the perspective of the Vision-in-One. It works on the desires of the White restrained Unconscious as an analyst works on the desires of an analysand, changing them morphing them, so that the latter can see from the perspective of the One. The end of the world denotes the end of metaphysical sovereignty and the identification in the last instance of the (Black) generalized Unconscious and the White restrained Unconscious. In Laruelle's *Theorie des Etrangers* he argues that Stranger is a "Self that is neither subjective nor objective, but immanent (to) itself, so that it is no longer divided between Self and Other, this one being no longer interior or exterior and exterior to the Self, but the Self exists immanently also itself, without "leaving" itself in a new structure which is that of the Stranger-it exists-Stranger." (Laruelle 1995, 13) This Stranger-Self can be used to describe the (non)-position of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. It is neither subjective, nor objective, partaking of neither Self nor Other, but radically constitutive of the Self/Other dynamic. Laruelle argues that this consists of an "ego-xeno-logic" in which the Stranger is the immanent identity of each Human

being. The Slave for Wilderson is similarly constitutive of the Human insofar as it gives birth to the World and the Self/Other dynamic. Anthony Paul Smith further echoes this argument by saying that "to be a Stranger to oneself is not to be an Other to oneself, but to be without any stable reference point in the world, to be separated ultimately through one's radical immanence (to oneself) from the world." (Smith 2016, 103) The Stranger-Subject as the Slave is the radical Identity of the Unconscious insofar as it takes the lived experience of history into account. The (Black) non-analyst must be the immanent identity of the philosophical subject that lives in history so as to be constantly working on the latter's desires as transcendental material from the perspective of immanent loss.

I am not here arguing that the (Black) Human *being* and the White Human *being* are identical, even in the last instance. What I am arguing is that the Stranger-Self of the White restrained Unconscious is the (Black) generalized Unconscious. The latter is not the Other of the White restrained Unconscious, but rather the immanent identity of the Unconscious (to) itself when it opens itself up to the desires of (Blackness) by ending the World, since (Blackness), since the Stranger do not exist *in* the World, but rather sees the desires of the World from its perspective.

Laruelle argues that "The closure of the Unconscious by the symptom-form in turn falls into the generalized Unconscious, and this symptom-form (including the other "forms") is no longer merely the object of a displacement and of a restrained analysis, but of an *emplacement* (my italics) by the universal or abstract Unconscious and of a dualysis that transforms it into simple material." (Laruelle 1989, 521) Instead of functioning by displacement or condensation, through the end of the World, there is an emplacement from the point of view or according to the (Black) generalized Unconscious. This is not an emplacing into as if the White restrained Unconscious were "larger" than the (Black) generalized Unconscious, but rather a postural change of perspective wherein the former is a site or location of analysis for the latter. There is a certain indication of the "placing-in" of foreign desires, desires that are not my own. The desires that come from the perspective of the (Black) non-analyst are far more opaque and expansive. They are not immediately the desires of my Ego, but they are the desires of the Stranger or Slave that is the immanent identity of my transcendental Self and Other, insofar as it takes world-history into account in the last instance. Thus, the desires of the Self and Other, the White restrained Unconscious, are seen as One from the perspective from the (Black) non-analyst. As Laruelle argues in his short essay "Universe Black in Human Foundations of Colour", "The [Black] Universe isn't the object of thought, a greater object than the World; it is thought's *how* or its *according to*." (Laruelle 1988, 402) The universe is far larger than the World, far more opaque, a superposition of wave and particle. To see *according to* perspective of the (Black) non-analyst is to see from the Vision-in-One. From this perspective the (Black) non-analyst "works" on the metaphysical desires of the White restrained Unconscious, the desires outlined above as "normal desires". In this sense, as Laruelle himself and his commentators have noted, Non-Philosophy, and in this case Non-Analysis is not a *negation* of psychoanalysis but rather its *expansion or dualysis* in the sense that one would use the phrase "Non-Euclidean". Thus, "a generalized analysis necessarily re-introduces into the sphere of analysis everything excluded, therefore psychoanalysis itself and as such with the ensemble of its decisions of the "non-analyzable." (Laruelle 1989, 520) There is therefore an expansion of desires of the White restrained Unconscious from the perspective of the (Black) non-analyst, since the latter expands the analyzable range of the former.

Wilderson argues that the metaphysical position of the "Savage" or indigenous peoples is partially constituted by genocide and sovereignty since the Savage's desires are that of reclaiming a lost sovereignty to the land taken from them. However, it is clear, that from the perspective of the White restrained Unconscious, this desire for a reclaiming of some kind sovereignty other than metaphysical is made but a pathological desire, one that cannot fall within the metaphysical sovereignty of Whiteness. In this sense "the (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here the Indian comes into being and is positioned by an a priori violence of genocide." (Wilderson 2010, 49) Seeing from the perspective of the (Black) non-analyst as the identity immanent to the generalized Unconscious, it works on the White restrained Unconscious so that the Savage's desire becomes a semimetaphysical desire capable of being desired and realized. This is a desire that cannot appear within the restrained losses of White metaphysical sovereignty. But since seeing from the point of view of the (Black) non-analyst puts them into chaos, new desires from the perspective of the One are introduced. Proceeding from this perspective (Black) nonanalyst, there is the possibility of replacing the White restrained Unconscious with a Multi-Racial Unconscious.

(Blackness) insofar as it appears as the (Black) non-analyst immanent to the (Black) generalized Unconscious or the Stranger-Subject already exists outside the World as immanent identity by virtue of its loss, which is why the desire to end the World is the necessary

movement that allows the White restrained Unconscious to see from the perspective of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. Insofar as this is true (Blackness) is the minimal perspective for a radical subjectivity, and the minimal perspective for freedom and the articulation of new desires that are seen as One from the point of view of the (Black) non-analyst in the last instance.

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