Labyrinth <p><em>Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics</em> is published since 1999 by the <a href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Institute for Axiological Research / Institut für Axiologische Forschungen</a> (Vienna). From 1999 till 2002 it was an on-line journal, thereafter it was published in printed volumes. It is actually both, a <em>printed academic journal</em>, available for purchase, and a <em>Platinum Open Access journal. </em>It is published twice a year, in late Summer and in December. </p> <p>As a nonpartisan philosophical and interdisciplinary journal <em>Labyrinth</em> is engaged in publication of high-quality peer-reviewed academic articles, critical essays, interviews and book reviews. The Title of the Journal was choosen not just to indicate the research topics of interest, but inindicates the deep interconenection between Philosophy/Theory of Values and Sociocultural Hermeneutics. Although it is focused on philosophy and on axiology, i.e. on the philosophy and theory of values and their sociocultural contexts, it is also open to related issues in all fields of the humanities and the social sciences with a special emphasis on critical thinking, social controversies and conflict resolution, interfaith dialogue, intercultural and cross-cultural communication, gender studies and managing diversity. </p> en-US <p>After acceptation of the paper, the author has to sign a Copyright Transfer Agreement granting to <em>Labyrinth</em> and Axia Academic Publishers the exclusive copyrights for the online and printed editions, and to deal with reprint requests from third parties. On special occasions, articles and studies published in <em>Labyrinth</em> may be republished in textbooks or collective works of Axia Academic Publishers as well as translated and published in other languages. By submitting a paper to <em>Labyrinth</em>, you implicitely agree with these conditions. </p> <p> </p> (Prof. Dr. Yvanka B. Raynova) (Gerhard Müller - Labyrinth OJS Technical Support) Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 OJS 60 Hans-Georg Gadamers Sprachlichkeit der hermeneutischen Erfahrung im Wechselspiel von Vernunft und Erfahrung, Wissenschaft und/oder soziale Vorstellungen, Tradition(en) und/oder Gemeinschaft am Beispiel von Thomas Morus' Utopia <p><em>Hermeneutics can be understood on the one hand as the art of interpretation, and on the other hand as a medium for dealing with the past, for conveying events, contexts or even writings in new ways of speaking for new recipients. The interpretation of writings, however, places special demands on hermeneutics: it does not take place in a sterile vacuum, but is rather embedded in a social and cultural context that shapes the interpretation or mediation and is an expression of a time, a fashion or a specific requirement of modernity. The question therefore arises as to what role reason and experience, science and/or social ideas, tradition(s) and/or community play in interpretation.</em></p> <p><em>Using Thomas More's masterpiece </em>Utopia<em> as an example, various resulting interpretative approaches to a concrete writing will be presented. Through the hermeneutic design of a historical horizon in relation to Thomas More's time as well as through the development of a historical awareness of the work, the possibility of an understanding of this world-famous, still controversial writing as well as the efficiency of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics will become recognisable.</em></p> Ulrich Arnswald Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 Gadamer's Gorgias: The Imperative of Self-Refutation <p><em>Gadamer has written several powerful studies of Platonic dialectic. His emphasis on shared understanding, the fusing of horizons and other hermeneutic notions are partially drawn from a study of Plato’s elenctic dialogues. However, Socrates in Gorgias makes a claim about the imperative of self-refutation that not only complicates our understanding of Socratic method, but Gadamer’s reading of it as well. </em></p> <p><em>This article is meant to explore just how the imperative of self-refutation causes difficulty for Gadamer’s understanding of dialectic, especially his distinction between authentic and inauthentic dialectic. After considering the nature of ‘refutation’, this article will examine whether Gadamer’s notions of shared understanding, the ‘facts of the matter’, and self-understanding help us to resolve this problem. It shall be concluded that the teacher must take any refutations of his/her own views seriously, but has no special obligation to refute (introspectively) any of their own views, even those beliefs, theories, principles or criteria that enable him to guide the argument.</em></p> Benjamin Hutchens Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 Wirkungsgeschichte and Background Metaphorics: A Reading of the Gadamer-Blumenberg Debate about Secularization <p><em>The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, it aims to analyze the philosophical debate between Gadamer and Blumenberg concerning the notion of secularization, which, in the author's view, has received less attention than it deserves; secondly, it intends thereby to shed light on an ontological ambiguity in Gadamer's hermeneutics, unintentionally detected by Blumenberg in his reply to Gadamer's review of </em>The Legitimacy of the Modern Age<em>. The importance of the paper is both historical-philosophical and theoretical: it spells out different aspects of a philosophical discussion whose relevance concern not only the secularization debate, but more generally the philosophy of history and the role of metaphors in understanding. The most relevant original contribution consists in the usage of Blumenberg's notion of background metaphorics as a tool for interpreting the role of the notion of history of effects in Gadamer's hermeneutics.</em></p> Marcello Ruta Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 Aus-einander-setzungzwischen Hermeneutik und Dekonstruktion und Gadamers Solidaritätsverständnis <p><strong><em>Aus-einander-setzung</em></strong><strong> between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction </strong><strong>and Gadamer's Concept of Solidarity</strong></p> <p><em>This paper will analyze the debate between Gadamer and Derrida and Gadamer's concept of solidarity. The previous research literature focused only on their first debate, which could only lead to limited results, even though the exchange between these two philosophers continued after the first debate. In addition, Gadamer revised a large part of his speech, which caused the first debate with Derrida, for publication. In this way, the accentuation of concepts and themes that Derrida found problematic in the published version differs considerably from that in Gadamer's real speech. For this reason, this paper will consider Gadamer's original manuscript, which is preserved in Deutsches Literatur Archiv in Marbach. My point is that in Derrida's funeral oration for Gadamer, </em>Uninterrupted Dialogue<em>, can be found some shared points of view between both philosophers, namely their interpretation of Paul Celan's poems. By means of their Celan interpretations, I will demonstrate that it is not good will that unites all human beings, but their existential fate to find death. Here we encounter the problem of solidarity in Gadamer's work, since in his interpretation of Celan he considers death (or mortality) to be the "ultimate solidarity" of human beings, whereas in his other texts he defines solidarity as a kind of friendship. Hence, Gadamer's understanding of solidarity is discussed in the last part of this paper. My argument is that the concept of solidarity and that of belonging are interconnected in Gadamer's texts and that in this point the concept of openness shows its fundamental role. </em></p> Maya Shiratori Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 Modelling Speech and Speakers: Gadamer and Davidson on dialogue, agreement, and intelligible difference <p><em>This paper examines Gadamer's and Davidson's dialogical models of interpretation. It shows them to be comparable, but importantly dissimilar with respect to the kind of agreement they require for communication to be possible. It is argued that this difference entails different concepts of alterity: they</em><em> model not only how we talk, but implicitly who we can intelligibly talk to. </em><em>Another important contribution of this paper is to uncover a distinction in Gadamer between two kinds of agreement missed so far by all commentators. </em><em>The final section of this paper defends a second thesis, namely that the degree of agreement required by the models is proportional to the conceptual difference it can make intelligible. Hence, the extent of graspable cultural difference is not only an empirical matter, but is entailed by our choice of model.</em></p> Vladimir Lazurca Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 On Gadamer's Heteronomy Argument: The "Irruption" of Reality vs. its "Strategic Excision" <p><em>The aim of this paper is to find out whether Gadamer is entitled to hold together his finitist commitment to the heteronomy of art and thought, and his advocacy of an "endless conversation with itself</em><em>"</em><em> of humankind. We focus on three texts: Gadamer’s dismis­sal of Carl Schmitt’s outside-in account of the heteronomy implied by the "irrup­tion of reality</em><em>"</em><em> in the play Hamlet and, as Archimedean point, Shakespeare’s "excision of reality" according to Stephen Greenblatt, and its inside-out heteronomic consequences. The results: Schmitt’s approach restricts Gadamer’s argument on the "endless dialogue", Gadamer’s rejoinder aggravates his own argumentative fragility, and Greenblatt’s perspectivation discloses a non-sequitur. The inspection of these texts attests that heteronomy per se does not entail any openness to "creative" interpretations, that a universalized </em>logos endiéthetos <em>is a chimera, and that there cannot be any "infinite conversation" which would sustain the Gadamerian interplay of question and answer.</em></p> Josep Maria Bech Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 On hermeneutical openness and wilful hermeneutical ignorance <p><em>In this paper I argue for the relevance of the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer for contemporary feminist scholarship on epistemic injustice and oppression. Specifically, I set out to argue for the Gadamerian notion of </em>hermeneutical openness<em> as an important hermeneutic virtue, and a potential remedy for existing epistemic injustices. In doing so I follow feminist philosophers such as Linda Martín Alcoff and Georgia Warnke that have adopted the insights of Gadamer for the purpose of social and feminist philosophy. Further, this paper is positioned in relation to a recent book chapter by Cynthia Nielsen and David Utsler in which they argue for the complementarity, and intersecting themes and concerns of Gadamer's hermeneutics and Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice. However, Nielsen and Utsler solely focus on Fricker's conception of epistemic injustice and the two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, that she identifies. In this paper I expand their analysis by considering other forms of epistemic injustice such as wilful hermeneutical ignorance and contributory injustice. Thus, this paper contributes to the budding literature on the relevance of Gadamer's work for the debates pertaining to epistemic injustice and oppression by expanding such analysis to other forms of epistemic injustice, and by further arguing for the strength of Gadamer's work in terms of offering relevant insights for the reduction and remedy of existing epistemic injustices.</em></p> Karl Landström Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 17 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400 L'injustice épistémique : questions de vérité et méthode <p><em>This article proposes the comparison of two methods of analysis, semiotics, and hermeneutics, to address contemporary issues in ethical and political philosophy, through the study of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. Conceptualized by Fricker (2007), epistemic injustice is synonymous with the denial of the value of knowledge that an individual possesses because of prejudices about the social group to which he or she belongs or is affiliated. When epistemic injustice is studied in the empirical world, it poses some crucial issues in terms of interpreting the meaning that the individual gives to the experience of injustice that he or she experiences. </em></p> <p><em>Although the interpretation of injustice is central to the understanding of the phenomenon itself, little research in ethical and political philosophy addresses these aspects, because of the failure to sufficiently mobilize analytical methods such as semiotics and hermeneutics. However, these two methods, usually used in other fields to deal with these aspects, allow us to question the treatment and the interpretative scope of the epistemic injustice by the different interlocutors involved in the interaction in which it is reconducted. </em></p> <p><em>The comparison of these two methods in the analysis of epistemic injustice finally allows us to argue in favor of the hermeneutic method, as defined by Gadamer and rethought by Code (2003), to enhance Gadamer's legacy through the analysis of ethical and political issues in human sciences research.</em></p> Coline Sénac Copyright (c) 2022 Labyrinth Sat, 03 Sep 2022 00:00:00 -0400