Bridging the Gap between Rationality, Normativity and Emotions

Frédéric Minner


This paper argues that emotions play a key role in intentional explanation, because they can be conceived as rational. Furthermore, their rationality is specific as they make agents act and react with respect to values and norms. Indeed, emotions have cognitive bases and are reactions to the presence of values and are regimented by epistemic norms that can be constrained by social norms. Additionally, thanks to their action and cognitive tendencies emotions ground rational actions by providing, among other features of rationality, intentions to promote values through norms of action that can also be constrained by social norms. In that sense, emotions seem to bridge the gap between rationality and normativity by articulating the rational detection and production of values related to epistemic and action norms that can be both regimented by social norms.



rationality, values, norms, emotions, intentional explanation

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